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In the last five years, over one-third of a million patents quietly expired for
lack of maintenance.' The inventions embodied in those patents represent a
peculiar balance of resource allocation. On one hand, that they were patented at
all suggests these inventions once warranted the development and concretization
of research, as well as the financing necessary to prosecute and secure patent
rights. However, that they subsequently expired for lack of maintenance reveals
that these inventions were eventually not even worth the relatively modest
statutory fee needed to keep them in force. 2 Sunk investments did not yield
returns. Perhaps other, more promising inventions took precedence. Regardless,
these inventions are now freely available in the public domain to be practiced
and improved upon. 3
To understand the significance of the public inheritance of the subjects of
expired patents, it is useful to understand the nature of that practice and to
examine a dataset of expired patents for commonality or patterns. Accordingly,
this Article presents a dataset of these recently expired patents to characterize

* Postdoctoral Associate, Duke University School of Law; NIH Center for Public Genomics
Postdoctoral Associate, Duke Institute for Genome Sciences & Policy; Expert Advisor, United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The arguments in this writing are the author's and
should not be imputed to the USPTO or any other organization. Sincere thanks to Roger Ford,
Kevin Collins, Yaniv Heled, Oskar Liivak, Christina Mulligan, Brenda Simon, and Stephen
Yelderman for thoughtful comments, and to Michael Carley, David Darwin, and Alan Marco for
methodological discussions. Different iterations of this project have benefited from presentation at
the 13th Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, the 2013 Global Medicine Challenge
Symposium at Whittier Law School, and PatCon 4: The Patent Conference.
1. See infra Figures 1-17.
2. See United States Patentand Trademark Office Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm#patapp (last visited Jan. 5,
2014) (listing patent maintenance fee amounts).
3. J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 941 (2011).
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them, primarily with respect to technology and geography, as well as to compare
them to recently issued patents as a springboard for rigorous empirical research
on the evolving balance of innovation in the U.S. economy. Part I contextualizes
the value of this new dataset within existing scholarship on the technology- and
geography-specific dimensions of patenting activity. Part II explains the
construction and usage of the dataset, provides descriptive statistics as well as
some preliminary policy-relevant inferences, and presents an outlook for
potential future research and analytical refinement enabled by this data.
I. THE WHAT AND THE WHERE OF PATENTS
A. Technology-Specificity in Patenting

A live debate persists on whether the U.S. patent system is, and should be (in
the words of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)), a truly "unitary system
with few a priori exclusions." The 2004 NAS Report submitted that it is such
a system.5 As a result, the report suggested that the U.S. patent system is a strong
one because a unitary system contributes to flexibility in the service of
accommodating new technologies-a self-evidently desirable driver of
innovation.6 As the NAS Report clarifies and critics emphasize, however, even
a purportedly unitary system is flexible only insofar as it can impose broad
standard-like criteria in a technology-agnostic manner without the sacrifice of
rule-like virtues (such as certainty, stability, and security) that arise from the
application of those standards in contexts that are often quite technologyspecific. 8
Indeed, as a practical matter, much patent doctrine is technology-specific
because it premises patentability requirements such as obviousness and
enablement upon what a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA)
would have been able to conceive with certain prior knowledge, 9 or may

4.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST

CENTURY 42 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NAS REPORT] (emphasis added).
5. See id. at 41.
6. Id. (stating that "[a] system granting even temporary monopoly rights to developers of
one technology but providing no incentives to developers of other, including substitute,
technologies obviously would be hostile to innovation over the long run"). If qualitatively obvious,
however, the actual economic harms to innovation attributable to fragmented monopoly-rights
regimes, favoring some technologies and industries at the expense of others, remains largely
unstudied.
7. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 400 (1985) (discussing
the vices and virtues of rules and standards as a legal dialectic).
8. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 45-46 ("Notwithstanding its unitary character, the U.S.
patent system is differentiated in transparent and subtle ways that accommodate differences in
technologies or that affect technologies differently.").
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (denying patent protection for inventions that would have
been obvious to "a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains").
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subsequently be able to accomplish with certain teaching. 0 This approach of
applying unitary legal standards to particular technologies, rather than crafting
disparate technology-specific regimes, can have significant retrospective and
prospective public policy consequences, particularly with regard to the incentive
function of patents.
Retrospectively, the unitary nature of patentability standards can affect
whether the patent incentive operates effectively to recoup investments already
sunk into research and development. 12 For example, Professor Jonathan Darrow
has argued that application of the PHOSITA standard for obviousness suffers
from an overreliance on defining the supposed level of skill and on delineating
the scope of relevant prior knowledge against which to judge the invention,
while neglecting the ordinarily skilled artisan's perspective within the art. 13 He
traced the history of three major perspectives: the mechanic, a tradesman "who
practiced his art with ordinary skill but who was not an inventor[;]" 1 4 the
designer, "whose work required a significant effort of the brain[;]"1 5 and the
professional researcher. 16
The patent system, he found, has drifted
inappropriately toward a researcher-based conception of ordinary skill that
systematically under-rewards innovation in the useful arts by defining the
relevant art itself in terms of innovative activity. 17
Prospectively, the unitary nature of patentability standards can affect whether,
and to what extent, institutional reforms in the patent system can successfully
promote incentive-aligned invention (i.e., invention that would not have come
about but for the promise of patent protection). 18 Thus, evaluating the

10. See id. at § 112(a) (explaining that patent protection requires a written description
sufficient to enable the practice of the invention by "any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains").
11. For a succinct discussion of the incentive function that patents are intended to serve, see
generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
266 (1977) (asserting "[t]he patent is a reward that enables the inventor to capture the returns from
his investment in the invention, returns that would otherwise (absent secrecy) be subject to
appropriation by others"). See also KENNETH J. ARROw, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISKBEARING 152 (Julius Margolis ed., 1971) (identifying "a fundamental paradox in the determination
of demand for information; its value for the purchaser is not known until he has the information,
but then he has in effect acquired it without cost").
12. See Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law's PHOSITA Standard,
23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227, 253 (2009) (discussing the importance of patent incentives as a method
of reducing investment risk).

13.
14.
15.
16.

See id. at 237-38.
Id. at 239-40.
Id. at 242-43.
Id. at 243-44.

17. See id. at 228 (explaining that "[b]ecause patent law is intended to encourage investment
in activities likely to lead to improvements in an art that is, research-a conception of the
PHOSITA as an 'ordinary researcher' becomes counterproductive").
18.

Daniel R. Cahoy, An IncrementalistApproach to PatentReform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.

& PUB. POL'Y 587, 621-22 (2006).
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desirability of different aspects of the patent right may require distinguishing the
availability of particular rights from the extent of those rights; such unitary
protection encourages or discourages invention differently with respect to
each. 19 In such a framework, extending the scope of patent-eligible subject
matter may encourage incentive-aligned invention where the patent-eligible
fields are valuable to society, are in need of investment incentives, and will
consequently generate innovative activity on an equal basis with other protected
fields. 20 However, it may discourage incentive-aligned invention if one of these
assumptions fails, particularly when patent protection does not have a significant
impact on incentives to innovate. 21
Similarly important is the extent of different aspects of the patent right,
including the breadth of protection that may be claimed, the types of activities
over which the patent may be asserted, the duration of the right, and the extent
of disclosure necessary to seal the patent bargain. 22 For example, the breadth of
what may be justified as a "pioneer patent" and its effect on follow-on
innovation, 23 particularly when broad patent rights may be granted early in the
innovation life cycle to forestall expensive duplication of research, 24 differs
between industries characterized by a significant amount of follow-on
innovation and those in which cumulative innovation is not the norm. 25 The
impact of a right to exclude without regard for infringer intent, 26 albeit a negative
right with no positive right to practice one's own invention, 27 differs in industries
19. See id. at 610-21 (discussing how legal attributes contribute to the patent incentive
structure).

20.

Id. at610-11.

21.

Id. (noting the market may impact the utility of patent incentives).

22.

Id. at 613.

23. Compare Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplacefor Ideas?, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 395, 409-10 (2005) (arguing that patents for pioneering inventions inherently create the risk
of hold-up with respect to downstream improvements that require access to the original invention),

with John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 489-90
(2004) (disputing the patent policy of allowing pioneers to prevent follow-on innovations from free

riding).
24.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 46-47 (5th ed. 1998).

25.

See Cahoy, supra note 18, at 615-16 (noting the benefits and detriments of prolonged

patent rights); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in PatentLaw, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1619-24 (2003) (illustrating a case study of software as an industry of incremental innovation
requiring idiosyncratically narrow and short-lived patents).
26.

Patent infringement as a strict liability tort is commonplace in case law. See, e.g., Hilton

Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd 520 U.S.
17 (1997) ("Intent is not an element of infringement. A patent owner may exclude others from
practicing the claimed invention, regardless of whether infringers even know of the patent . . . .")
(internal citations omitted). But see Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its
Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800-07 (2002) (framing patent
infringement as a "modified strict liability" tort in which actual or constructive notice of the patent
may, indeed, be relevant to the extent of the infringer's liability).
27. See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 16.02[1] (2014) (explaining that "[a] patent
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where mutual blocking patents 28 carry a greater risk of creating patent thickets
and in those less characterized by overlapping rights. 29 The optimality of a
twenty-year patent term30 may balance the incentive to innovate with the search
cost associated with avoiding infringement differently in industries with
relatively short product life, such as software, 3 1 compared to industries where
product development and regulatory approval cycles can be quite long, such as
in the pharmaceutical field.32 Thus, the ideal patent term may vary with the
useful life of the patented invention. 33 Significantly, the sufficiency of a

basically grants to the patentee and his assigns the right to exclude others from making, using, and
selling the invention" but "does not grant the affirmative right to make, use or sell").
28. The phenomenon of blocking patents arises from the many-to-one relationship that often
exists between patents and their associated products or services: where separate patents claim
different aspects of the same invention, each patentee may block the other from fully practicing the
invention in a commercially meaningful way. See Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in

PatentLaw, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 330-35 (2009) (providing a discussion of the conceptual
role of blocking patents in the view of patents as exclusionary rights).
29. See Cahoy, supra note 18, at 616-18 (noting that incentives for property holders in the
technology industry create overlapping interests); see also Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent
Thicket: Cross Licenses, PatentPools, and StandardSetting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe et al eds., 2001) (describing patent thickets as a "dense web of
overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to
actually commercialize new technology" and explaining that they are an extreme case of the
commercial impasse that can arise from mutual blocking patents). Affected industries include
biotechnology, where a fragmentation of diffusely held patent rights on intellectual resources, such
as genetic information, may create an anticommons in which product development would impose
high transaction costs to bundle together all the relevant rights to avoid hold-up. See Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (hypothesizing that today's upstream biomedical research is
increasingly likely to become more privatized and supported by private funding, possibly resulting
in more frequent overlapping patent claims).
30. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (generally providing, subject to adjustments for undue
examination delays, that the term of a patent shall expire twenty years from the filing date of the
earliest application to which the patent claims priority).
31. FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 109 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FTC REPORT].

32.

See id. at 91-92.

&

33. Cahoy, supra note 18, at 618-19 (addressing the pros and cons of a flexible patent law
system). The economic impacts on innovation of fixed patent terms-and the econometric
estimation of optimal variable patent terms have received considerable attention in economic
literature. See, e.g., Eric Budish et al., Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation? Evidence from
Cancer Clinical Trials, NBER
PROGRAM
ON
PRODUCTIVITY,
INNOVATION,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1-2,5 (2013) (focusing on distortion of research and development under fixed
patent terms for cancer treatments); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A

Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1821-27 (1984) (suggesting a framework for approaching
the patent-antitrust conflict, defining the optimum patent life from an economic viewpoint); F.M.
Scherer, Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation,62 AM. ECON.
REV. 422, 423-24 (1972) (extrapolating upon a recent empirical analysis calculating the optimum
duration of patent protection); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 37-38 (1991) (concluding that
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disclosure-in providing public notice of a patent's boundaries or in teaching
the invention to the ordinarily skilled artisan-may vary based on whether, for
example, the pertinent art employs a standardized vocabulary,3 4 whether the art
addresses predictable versus unpredictable natural phenomena, 35 or even
fundamentally whether, in a given art, the appropriability of inventive rewards
from trade secrecy "outweighs the benefits of patent exclusivity" in the
invention.36

In view of these public policy consequences, a growing body of empirical
scholarship has characterized the differing roles that patents play across
technologies and industries. The seminal study of this kind is that of Professors
Wesley Cohen, Richard Nelson, and John Walsh, finding that firms employ a
variety of protections for the profits associated with their inventions beyond

social value is not linked to research costs, and as a result, the information used to calculate
optimum patent length is exclusively available to patent examiners and the courts).
34. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 153, 201 (2008) (attributing the
increased value of patents in the field of chemical structures and compositions in part to concrete
and standardized boundaries put on patents in those fields, and vice-versa in the case of software
and semiconductors). One prominent proposed policy response has been to require patent
applicants to more clearly delineate ex ante the bounds of their claims by, for example, defining
specialized terms and distinguishing between limitative and illustrative embodiments. See Peter S.
Menell, Promoting Patent Claim Clarity 1-2 (Univ. of Berkeley, Research Paper No. 2171287,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2171287.

35.

Construing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the USPTO expressly gauged,

among several factors, the "predictability . .. of the art" when evaluating whether the applicant has
sufficiently enabled her invention for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 112. See MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 2164.01(a) (9th ed. 2014). The relevance of scientific unpredictability
on technology-specific patentability outcomes came to a head in Ariad Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Eli

Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010), in which the court noted two distinct, co-equal
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 112: to establish that (1) the inventor possessed the claimed invention, and
(2) that the inventor adequately taught the ordinarily skilled artisan how to practice the claimed
invention. However, commentators have variously emphasized and minimized the relevance of the
unpredictable arts doctrine following Ariad. Compare, e.g., Joseph Jakas, EncouragingFurther
Innovation: Ariad v. Eli Lilly and the Written Description Requirement, 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
1287, 1292 ("For a complex and ever-changing field like biotechnology, the written description
requirement provides a useful and straightforward tool for courts in determining what invention an
inventor actually possessed at the time he filed his claim."), with Greg R. Vetter, Patent Law 's

Unpredictability Doctrine and the Software Arts, 76 Mo. L. REV. 763, 796 ("If undue
experimentation is understood . .. as . . . learning effort . . . based on lack of predictability in . .
technology, this purpose does not apply in written description[] . . the disclosure's purpose is not
to provide information to make and use. [It] is to provide information to allow the artisan to
understand what was invented.").
36. Cahoy, supra note 18, at 619-21 (discussing the benefits of both patent transparency and
patent secrecy). For a balanced critique of the largely one-sided preference in contemporary legal
doctrine and innovation policy for patent-mediated disclosure over trade secrecy, see Anderson,
supra note 3, at 939-40, 950.
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applying for patents, including secrecy, first-mover advantage, and
complementary marketing and manufacturing. 37
More recently, and with specific focus on high technology, Professors Stuart
Graham, Robert Merges, Pam Samuelson, and Ted Sichelman found in the 2008
Berkeley Patent Survey that technology startups often seek and own patents in
ways and for reasons that are industry-specific. 38 Further, they found that
patents, while relatively weak incentives for core innovation activities, confer
significant competitive advantages in preventing copying, securing capital, and
enhancing market reputation. 39 Further building on the Berkeley Patent Survey,
Professors Graham and Sichelman have discussed in greater detail the strategic
use that entrepreneurs and start-up firms make of patents, such as leverage in
cross-licensing negotiations and signaling in capital markets, particularly in the
biotechnology and medical device sectors. 40
At the opposing end are arguments against the essentiality of differences
among industries, both as to their usage of the patent system and with respect to
the impact of the patent system upon their efficient operation. 41 Repudiating
calls for a "post-unitary patent system," 42 for example, Robert Armitage has
found an absence of industry-specific differences with respect to the relevant
criteria for evaluating the merits of a patent system.43 The need to address socalled industry differences in institutional reform, he argues, instead reflects
systemic failings that affect certain technology sectors differently or
negatively-not for any reason inherent to an affected sector, but merely due to
the nascence of patenting in that sector. 44
37. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their IntellectualAssets: AppropriabilityConditions
and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 5, 24 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,

Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).
38.

Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneursandthe PatentSystem: Results

of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1283, 1297-99 (2009).
39. Id.
40.

See Ted M. Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs:An Empirical

Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 111, 179 (2010); Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted M.
Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1095-96 (2008).
&

41. See, e.g., Robert A. Armitage, The Myth of Inherent and Inevitable "Industry
Diferences": "Diversity" as Artifact in the Quest For PatentReforms, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REv. 401, 403-06 (2007). The agenda of the conference in which Robert Armitage, Senior
Vice President and General Counsel of Eli Lilly and Company, presented these arguments included,
in pertinent part, the following discussion topics: How "unitary" is the present patent system as a
practical matter?; Through what mechanisms, and how effectively, does the patent adapt to
different technologies, industries, markets, or innovation practices?; "At what level and how would
a 'post-unitary' patent system differentiate among economic characteristics and conditions?" See
id. at 402 (stating that industry differences for patent purposes is unproven).
42.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

43. See id. at 404-07 (listing benchmarks of systemic success as well as failure benchmarks
which, Armitage argues, arise uniformly in intellectual property management strategy, regardless
of industry sector).
44. Id. at 407-12. But see James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex
Technologies 3 (Research on Innovation & Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 0401,
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Lastly, on the basis of this and other empirical evidence have come fully
normative arguments that the patent system either should, or should not, be
making economic policy determinations with explicit regard for differences
among technologies and industries. For example, Professors Stuart Minor
Benjamin and Arti Rai have advanced a detailed blueprint for applying
administrative law principles to the operation of patent law and doctrine. 45 Their
aim was to invigorate judicial review of administrative patent outcomes,
particularly in the context of a post-grant opposition system in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), with the goal of improving the quality
of patents issued by that agency. 46 Such procedures have since been enacted
into law as part of broad reforms in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,47
including a transitional post-grant review proceeding specific to certain business
method patents. 4 8
B. Geography-Specificity in Patenting

If discussion of technology-specificity in patents is a live debate, the role of
geography in patenting is no less storied. Beginning with the economic work of
Professors Adam Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg, and Rebecca Henderson to find the
elusive "paper trail by which [knowledge flows] may be measured and
tracked,'4 9 the geographic analysis of patent citations has generated considerable
insight into the broader question of how spillovers from research and
development affect productivity and economic growth, whether in particular
industries (such as semiconductors5 0 ), in particular economic sectors (such as

2003), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=327760 (arguing that aggressive use of cross-licensing
affects industries not evenly, but in proportion to industry maturity).
45.

See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent

System Can Learnfrom Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 335-36 (2007).
46. Id. at 270-72.
47. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
throughout sections of 35 U.S.C.).
48. See id. at § 18. The language defining what are, and are not, eligible business method
patents is starkly industry-specific: "[T]he term 'covered business method patent' means a patent
that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other
operations used in the practice, administration, or management of afinancialproduct or service,
except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions." Id. at § 18(d)(1)

(emphasis added).
49. Adam B. Jaffe et al., GeographicLocalization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by
Patent Citations, 108 Q. J. ECON. 577, 578 (1993) (citing PAUL KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND
TRADE 53 (1991)). Professor Jaffe and his co-authors found that patents were significantly more
likely to cite other patents from the same country, state, and locality (defined by standard
metropolitan statistical areas) than to cite patents not so localized, suggesting that geographic
proximity has a strong effect on the magnitude of knowledge spillovers. See id. at 595-96
(concluding spillovers are geographically localized).
50. See, e.g., Paul Almeida, Knowledge Sourcing by ForeignMultinationals:Patent Citation
Analysis in the U.S. SemiconductorIndustry, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 155, 155 (1996) (recognizing
the concept of "innovative regions").
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universities5 1), or for particular organizational structures (such as parentsubsidiary corporations and multinationals 52). The Jaffe-Trajtenberg-Henderson
study itself has been subsequently updated with methodological refinements 53
and further discussion. 54 The legal literature, too, has explored the geographic
dimension of patenting at all stages of innovation.55
Innovative activity itself, for example, tracked patent filings quite well as a
proxy for invention across geography and over time through the first halfcentury of U.S. history and revealed, inter alia, a strong correlation between
patenting activity and proximity to navigable waterways. 56 Similarly, early U.S.
patent policy showed a preference for greater democratic participation from
"relatively ordinary individuals" to such an extent that "the rise in patenting was
associated with a democratic broadening of the ranks of patentees to include
individuals, occupations, and geographic districts with little previous experience
in invention."57
More contemporarily-oriented research has conversely found that, in highly
innovative environments, such as Silicon Valley, the fact of geographic
localization itself is less a driver of innovation than is access to investment
51.

See, e.g., Rebecca Henderson et al., Universities as a Source of Commercial Technology:

A DetailedAnalysis of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 119, 119 (1998)
(exploring the growth of patents sought by universities).
52.

See, e.g., Tony S. Frost, The Geographic Sources of Foreign Subsidiaries'Innovations,

22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 101, 102 (2001); Jasjit Singh, Multinational Firms and Knowledge
Difusion: Evidence Using Patent Citation Data 3 (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2004/75/SM,
2004), available at www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=1428.
53. Peter Thompson & Melanie Fox-Kean, PatentCitationsand the Geography ofKnowledge
Spillovers: A Reassessment: Reply, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465 (2005) (summarizing a mode of
reassessment).
54. See Rebecca Henderson et al., Patent Citations and the Geography of Knowledge
Spillovers: A Reassessment: Comment, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 461, 461 (2005) (addressing criticism
of the authors' original study); Thompson & Fox-Kean, supra note 53, at 465.
55.

See Peter Lee,

Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and

OrganizationalIntegration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1536-37 (2012)
(providing a discussion of spillover in legal literature).
56.

Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventive Activity in Early Industrial America: Evidence from

PatentRecords, 1790-1846, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 813, 813, 817 (1988). Professor Sokoloff expressly
draws from more general explorations into the economic history of U.S. industrialization. See, e.g.,
BROOKE HINDLE, EMULATION AND INVENTION 25 (1981) (citing the steamboat as an early
example of U.S. patents); BROOKE HINDLE & STEVEN LUBAR, ENGINES OF CHANGE: THE
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1790-1860 78 (1986) (discussing the initial American
patent system). More importantly, however, he also draws methodologically from econometric
analysis into the level and direction of early inventive activity, particularly as to the systematic use
of patent data. See Jacob Schmookler, The Level of Inventive Activity, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT.
183, 183-84 (1954) (noting the benefits of reviewing patent data); see also DAVID S. LANDES, THE
UNBOUND PROMETHEUS: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN
WESTERN EUROPE FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT 201 (1969) (citing factors that led to industrial
expansion).
57. B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS
IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920 9 (2005).
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capital. 8 Still, in innovation ecosystems characterized by localized knowledge
spillovers,5 9 such as the electric vehicle industry, the impacts of industrial
agglomeration on R&D investments 60 and employment 6 1 suggest that that
industry will, indeed, cluster geographically. 62
Once granted, patents also receive attention with respect to their transaction
across geographies. 63 The traditional conception of university-to-industry
technology transfer as a market of discrete exchanges, for example, has given
way to a model of direct personal relationships with academic inventorsrelationships that are better suited to conveying the necessary, but tacit and
uncodified, know-how that is associated with the successful exploitation of
patents. 64 Notably, where "technologies are discrete commodities, transaction
costs are low, and technical disclosure is adequate, patent licensing should not
correlate

with

geographic

distance.

However,

contrary

to expectation,

universities do exhibit a notable tendency to license to firms near them." 65
Beyond technology transfer, direct monetization of patents through licensing in
the shadow of litigation also has geographic consequences, particularly as to
taxable patent revenue. 66
There is also a rich literature on the geography of patent disputes, albeit
derived largely from analyses of forum shopping and its consequences in patent

58.

Tom Nicholas, What Drives Innovation?, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 787, 806-07 (2011)

(discussing venture capital and private equity). The supervening importance of venture capital is
also well-characterized empirically. See, e.g., Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the

Contributionof Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 689-90 (2000).
59. See generallyJaffe et al., supranote 49, at 26-27 (discussing evidence that such spillovers
are geographically localized, but that these locations fade over time).

60.

See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126, 1130-32

(1992) (explaining that geographic clustering among firms, either in the same industry or across
industries, leads to a positive externality of knowledge spillovers, and that this effect is particularly
significant in large cities).
61. See, e.g., Stefano Breschi & Francesco Lissoni, Localized Knowledge Spillovers Versus
Innovative Milieux: Knowledge "Tacitness" Reconsidered, 80 PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCI. 255,
261-62 (2001) (discussing the ways in which knowledge exchange depends on characteristics of
the particular technology labor market and on the employment structures of locally clustered firms).
62.

Nicholas, supra note 58, at 806.

63.

See infra note 64 and accompanying text.

64. Lee, supra note 55, at 1537. Professor Lee drew from the empirical literature of
knowledge flows with a focus on particular clusters, such as Silicon Valley and the Boston Route

128 Corridor. See id. at 1536 n.215, 1537 (citing Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of
High Technology IndustrialDistricts:Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete,

74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 575 (1999)); see also Juan Alcicer & Wilbur Chung, Location Strategies
and Knowledge Spillovers, 53 MGMT. SCI. 760, 760, 765 (2007) (positing that power firms will try
to locate themselves near universities); David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman, R&D

Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation and Production, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 630, 639 (1996)
(finding areas with higher levels of spillover have increased levels of innovation).
65.

Lee, supra note 55, at 1536.

66. Khurram Naik, For Sale. Patents. Never Used: Gaps in the Tax Codefor PatentSales, 11
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 859, 863-64 (2012).
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litigation, 67 which receives additional context from federal litigation of a
complexity analogous to that of patents 68 and litigation generally. 69 Two notable
departures from this literature look past the geography of litigation-even patent
litigation-to the underlying geography of litigated patents.
On one side is Judge Moore's widely cited empirical study examining forum
shopping. Judge Moore describes forum shopping as more than an outcomedriven exercise in estimated win rates, but as a nuanced geographic pursuit of
judges and juries who are knowledgeable about particular technologies. 70 She
emphasizes that forum shopping has significant consequences for incentives to
innovate.7 A potential remedy, Judge Moore has argued, is patent specialization
at the trial court level, without the stringent venue and transfer rules that would
too widely disperse patent infringement case filings throughout the federal
judiciary to the detriment of judicial efficiency.7 2
In contrast to Judge Moore's argument is Professor Jeanne Fromer's study of
patent disputes, which examines the formation, under permissive venue rules, of
geographic clusters that are technology-specific with respect to the underlying
patents.73
Professor Fromer argues that, rather than dispersing patent
infringement case filings too widely, more restrictive venue and transfer rules
would instead lead industries to cluster at those particular geographic centers
where the natural concentration of those industries was already high.74
67.

See, e.g., Scott E. Atkinson et al., The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity,

Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411, 412, 440-41 (2009) (presenting
&

econometric comparisons of adjudicative non-uniformity and forum shopping before and after the
establishment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC)); Jay P. Kesan
Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency andAccuracy of PatentAdjudication:
An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH.

393, 411-12, 420-22 (2011) (empirically relating the quality of patent adjudication to the degree
of judicial patent specialization, highlighting the "rampant forum shopping" sought to be
ameliorated by the 1982 establishment of the CAFC); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the
PatentRocket Docket: An EmpiricalStudy ofInfringementLitigation 1985-2010, 11 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 58, 60 (2011) (proposing a new statistical framework for identifying and
comparing "patent rocket docket" forums that are commonly targets of forum shopping).
68. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Perloff et al., Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes, 78 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 401, 401 (1996) (studying antitrust settlements).
69.

See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evils of Forum

Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508-11 (1995) (discussing the trends of venue shopping
and the consequences the practice may have on litigation).
70.

Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect

Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 899, 907, 925 (2001).
71. See id. at 927-28.
72.

Id. at 932, 934, 936.

See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional

Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 804-05 (2008)
(discussing the benefits of judicial patent specialization at the trial court level, as well as of limiting
amendments to venue and transfer law).

73.

Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1447-49 (2010).

74. See id. at 1447 (providing examples, including "the pharmaceutical industry in New
Jersey and the software industry in Silicon Valley and the Boston and Seattle areas").
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C. The Public Domain Gap
While strategic acquisition, transaction, and especially litigation of patents
have been the subject of sophisticated technology-specific and geographyspecific analysis,' 5 the public domain into which these patents ultimately pass is
not well characterized along either dimension. This is not to say that the legal
literature is silent on the right of the public to freely use the subject matter of
expired patents.7 6 Patent case law, too-especially regarding eligible subject
matter itself-has long guarded against preempting a public domain of "basic
tools of scientific and technological work." 77 Tools that may be excludable for
previously being known include expired patents and phenomena or products of
nature, even if previously unknown.78 Still, specific empirical discussion of the
contents and implications of the public domain itself is lacking.
II. THE EXPIRED PATENTS DATASET

The expired patents dataset begins to fill this empirical gap by examining
patents that have expired for failure to pay statutorily required maintenance
fees.79
A. Data and Methodology
Comprehensive data containing patent maintenance fee and bibliographic
information on issued patents has been available since 2010 through an
agreement between the USPTO and Google.80 As of June 2013, the updates to
information are available through an agreement between the USPTO and Reed

75. See, e.g., id. at 1493, 1496 (describing a national study of district court patent cases
consisting of at least one patent claim).
76. See, e.g., Perry J. Saidman, Kan TrafFix Kops Katch the Karavan Kopy Kats? Or Beyond
Functionality:Design Patents are the Key to Unlocking the Trade Dress/PatentConundrum, 82 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 839, 843 (2000) (arguing that "there is solid, ample precedent for
the public's right to copy products in the public domain"); see also TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.

Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29-30, 35 (2001) (holding that the patentability of the dual-spring
configuration of TrafFix's sign stand created a presumption of functionality that counseled against
trade dress protection, which only extends to distinctive and non-functional aspects of appearance).

77.

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).

78. See Richard Seth Gipstein, The Isolation and Purification Exception to the General
UnpatentabilityofProductsofNature, 4 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003). Nor, arguably,
must these two sets of exceptions be doctrinally coherent with each other "beyond both being
corollaries of the principle of an inviolable public domain." Id.

79.

See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2012). All patents that issue from applications that were filed on

or after December 12, 1980 are subject to three maintenance fees, payable three and a half years,
seven and a half years, and eleven and a half years from the date of issuance and each with a sixmonth grace period. Id. Failure to pay these maintenance fees results in the expiration of the patent
at the end of the grace period: four, eight, or twelve years from issuance, respectively. Id.
80. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Teams with Google to
Provide Bulk Patent & Trademark Data to the Pub. (June 2, 2010), available at
www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2010/10_22.jsp.

Expired Patents

2015]

431

Technology and Information Services (RTIS).81
Merging these two data
sources 82 by patent number enabled the construction of a dataset comprising the
following original variables:
-

patent number;

-

patent application filing date;

-

patent issuance date;

-

patent technology class;

-

patent technology subclass;

-

inventor name;

-

inventor city (for domestic inventors);

-

inventor state (for domestic inventors);

-

inventor zip code (for domestic inventors, if available);

-

country code (for foreign inventors);

-

dates of all maintenance events; and

83
event codes describing all maintenance events.
Using the patent technology class, the resulting dataset was matched to the
Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg aggregate technology category and subcategory system
by concordance to the U.S. Patent Classification system. 84
The dataset
additionally comprised patent age at expiration. The concordance uniquely
assigns categories and subcategories to 418 U.S. patent classes, leaving an
additional ten unassigned U.S. patent classes that were created after the last HallJaffe-Trajtenberg concordance was developed. For these remaining U.S. patent
classes, Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg categories and subcategories were manually
assigned as shown in Table 1.
The resulting dataset was filtered to keep expiration events-events reflecting
a failure to pay the maintenance fee-that took place between January 1, 2008

81. Reed Technology Announces Launch of USPTO Public Data Dissemination Site,
Expansion of Reed Tech PatentAdvisor Service, Bus.WIRE, http://www.businesswire.com/news/

home/20130620005234/en/Reed-Technology-Announces-Launch-USPTO-Public-Data#.VKxPgt
yRPwI (last updated June 20, 2013, 11:50 AM).
82. See USPTO Bulk Downloads: Patent Grant Bibliographic Data, GOOGLE,
www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto-patents-grants-biblio.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2014); USPTO
Bulk Downloads: Patent Maintenance Fees, GOOGLE, www.google.com/googlebooks/usptopatents-maintenance-fees.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
83. See U.S. PatentGrantMaintenance Fee Events File, GOOGLE 1-11 (Dec. 2009), available
at storage.googleapis.com/patents/maint fee-events/current/MaintFeeEventsFileDocumentation
.doc. For documentation explaining the country codes, specifically, see Country Codes, USPTO
PAT. FULL-TEXT & IMAGE DATABASE, www.uspto.gov/patft/help/helpctry.htm (last updated July

31, 2014).
84. See generally Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons,
Insights and Methodological Tools 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498,
2001). See also The NBER U.S. Patent Citations DataFile: Lessons, Insights, and Methodological

Tools, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/patents/ (last updated May 16, 2012)
(providing the category and subcategory definitions, as well as the concordance).
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and December 31, 2012. Descriptive statistics were then generated for this final
dataset.
B. Discussion
Overall, the mean age of patents that expired during each month in the fiveyear observation window was stable at 8.18 years (coefficient of variation =
4.4%), coinciding with the second maintenance fee payment.
Segmented by Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg technology category, the mean
expiration age of patents ranged from 7.5 to 9 years as shown in Figure 1.
Among expiring cohorts, "Computers and Communications" patents were
consistently the youngest at expiration, followed by "Electrical and Electronic."
Older still at expiration were "Mechanical" and "Other" patents, which generally
tracked and intersected one another's trends. Finally, "Chemical" and "Drugs
and Medical" patents were the oldest at expiration.
Notably, beginning around August 2009, the mean age of expiring patents in
all categories rose together, peaked around March 2010, and fell together until
June 2010. Figure 2 summarizes these trends. At the mean, the estimated
months in which each of these expiration cohorts had previously issued are
shown in Table 2.
Similarly, starting around June 2011, the mean age of patents in all categories
rose together, peaked around January 2012, and fell together until June 2012.
Figure 3 summarizes these trends. Table 3 illustrates the estimated months in
which each of these expiration cohorts previously issued.
Figure 4 confirms these trends by an alternate visualization, using the mean
patent age of each monthly expiration cohort to estimate the mean month in
which that cohort of patents had issued. Just as each of the two time periods
described in Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 2 and 3 correspond in Figure 1 with a
rise and a fall in mean expiration age, so also do these two time periods
correspond in Figure 4 with the contractions identified within the otherwise
linear time lag between issuance and expiration.
These breaks from the otherwise stable issuance-expiration lag suggest prior
bursts of issuance activity roughly eight years prior to each rise in the mean
expiration age. Figure 5 confirms this intuition, showing a marked rise in patent
issuances during each of the two prior issuance time periods estimated in Tables
2 and 3, respectively.
Segmented geographically by U.S. state, the mean expiration age of patents
ranged from 6.5 years to 9.5 years, as shown in Figure 6.8 Among expiring
cohorts, Idaho and Vermont patents were consistently the youngest, while Iowa
and New Hampshire patents were largely the oldest. Interestingly, patents from
Oklahoma were, by turns, among the youngest at expiration (January 2010-May
85. This analysis looked at those U.S. states with the highest total numbers of patent
expirations during 2008-2012. The top thirty-four such states each claimed at least 1,000 patent
expirations as determined by the home state of the first-named inventors of the patented inventions.
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2010) and among the oldest at expiration (August 2012-November 2012).
Figure 7 revisualizes these trends using the mean patent age of each monthly
expiration cohort to estimate the mean month in which that patent cohort issued.
Moreover, unlike technology segmentation, which showed similar time trends
with a higher or lower mean patent age at expiration, geographic segmentation
appears to show a stable mean patent age of approximately eight years while
differing by state in its variation from the mean. Thus, as shown in Figure 8,
those U.S. states with higher five-year totals in patent expirations showed
markedly lower variation in the number of expired patents per month than did
those states with lower five-year totals.
Segmented geographically by foreign country, 86 the mean expiration age of
patents ranged from four years to ten years, as shown in Figure 9. Among
expiring cohorts, patents from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were consistently
the youngest, while patents from no single country were consistently the oldest.
Figure 10 revisualizes these trends using the mean patent age of each monthly
expiration cohort to estimate the mean month in which that cohort of patents
issued.
Again, unlike technology segmentation, which showed similar time trends
with a higher or lower mean patent age at expiration but in a manner similar to
geographic segmentation by U.S. state, geographic segmentation by foreign
country appears to show a stable mean patent age of about eight years while
differing by foreign country in the variation from the mean. The three countries
identified as consistently having the youngest patents in each monthly expiration
cohort, however-China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong-are, by definition,
exceptions to this trend, as shown in Figures 7 and 8. Thus, as shown in Figure
11, those foreign countries with higher five-year totals in patent expirations
showed markedly lower variation in the number of expired patents per month
than did those with lower five-year totals.
Cross-segmentation allows comparison of geographic sectors by technology.
Figure 12-1 shows the number of expired patents per Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg
technology category by U.S. state. Figure 12-2 shows the same as a stacked bar
chart. Figure 12-3 shows the percentage share of each state's patent expirations
across the six Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg technology categories.
Because the U.S. states in Figure 12-1 are shown in descending order of fiveyear total expirations, patents expiring uniformly across technology would
reveal a monotonically decreasing distribution from left to right. However, this
is not the case. A disproportionately high number of expirations from Texas, for
example, were "Computers and Communications" patents. The same was true
of Michigan with respect to "Mechanical" patents, and Massachusetts and
Maryland with regard to "Drugs & Medical" patents.

86. This analysis looked only at those foreign countries with the highest total numbers of
patent expirations during 2008-2012. The top twenty such states each had attributed to them at
least 800 patent expirations as determined by the home country of the first-named inventor.
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Figure 12-2 substantiates these trends as percentage shares of patent
expirations across Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg technology categories for each state.
Whereas patents expiring uniformly across technology would reveal roughly
equal shares of 16.7% within each Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg technology category,
"Computers and Communications" patents accounted for 29.9% of expirations
from Texas, and "Mechanical" patents accounted for 39.1% of expirations from
Michigan. Similarly, "Drugs & Medical" patents accounted for 30.7% of patent
expirations in Massachusetts and 33.7% of patent expirations in Maryland.
These findings track conventional wisdom regarding Texas as a hub of
computer and communications technology;8 7 Michigan as, historically (and
again in recent years), a center of mechanical, particularly automotive,
technology;8 8 and Massachusetts and Maryland as centers of biotechnology and
pharmaceuticals. 89

Finally, examining similar bibliographic information on newly granted
patents during the same time period allows direct comparison between
inventions that are entering the domain of patent protection and inventions that
are leaving protection for the public domain, a useful comparison across
technologies and of particular importance to geographic spillovers. Figures 141 and 14-2 show this comparison across U.S. states ordered decreasingly by
expirations and grants, respectively. Figures 14-3 and 14-4 show it across
87.

See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.

717, 723 (2010) (discussing the rise of Austin, Texas, as a center of high-technology, patterned in
part after centrally planned innovation hubs, such as North Carolina's Research Triangle Park and
in part after organic start-up-driven growth centers like Silicon Valley). Professor Ibrahim credits
Austin's planned growth largely to Teledyne founder George Kozmetsky, the so-called "father of
Austin high technology," and the city's organic growth to start-up firms, including Dell Computer
and venture capital firms like Austin Ventures. Id. at 723 & n.18.
88. See, e.g., Jennifer Bradley & Bruce Katz, The One Building that Explains How Detroit
Could Come Back: A Plan to Foster Innovation Amidst Bankruptcy, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 28,
2013), www.newrepublic.com/article/114447/one-building-explains-how-detroit-could-comeback.
89. See generally Ross DEVOL ET AL., AMERICA'S BIOTECH AND LIFE SCIENCE CLUSTERS
32-33 (2004), available at http://assetslc.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/Research
Report/PDF/biotech clusters.pdf (citing Boston's second-place rank for biotech innovations).
Specifically regarding Massachusetts, see Jarunee Wonglimpiyarat, Boston Route 128 Revisited, 2
INT'L J. INNOVATION & TECH. MGMT. 217, 221-22 (2005) (discussing the transformation during
the 1990s and onward of Boston's Route 128 corridor into a hub of biotechnology innovation and
knowledge transfer from a previous focus on mini-computer and microprocessor technology), and
Gilson, supra note 64, at 588-89 (describing the structural origins of the Route 128 corridor's
ecosystem of university-industry collaboration as a product of post-World War II and Cold War
federal investment in the cultivation of a technically skilled workforce and of a so-called
"agglomeration economy"). With specific regard to Maryland, see SHELDON KRIMSKY,
BIOTECHNICS & SOCIETY: THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL GENETICS 35-36 (1991) (noting that during
the early 1990s, half of biotechnology firms in the United States located themselves at a handful of

geographic centers, including Maryland), and Alison Peck, Leveling the PlayingField in GMO Risk
Assessment: Importers, Exporters and the Limits of Science, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 241, 265 (2010)
(attributing this early geographic positioning to proximity with major bioscience research
universities).
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foreign countries, similarly ordered decreasingly by expirations and grants,
respectively.
As with the previously discussed cross-segment comparison of geographic
sectors by technology, the descending order of patent expirations across U.S.
states in Figure 14-1 and across foreign countries in Figure 14-3 suggests that
commensurate rates of patent grants would reveal a monotonically decreasing
distribution from left to right across the same states and countries. This is not
the case, however, as a number of U.S. states accounted for patent grants
markedly exceeding their incidence of patent expiration; notably, these include
Texas, Massachusetts, and Washington, as demonstrated in Figure 14-1.
Foreign countries with similar trends, as illustrated by Figure 14-3, include
South Korea, Canada, and China.
Conversely, the descending order of patent grants across U.S. states in Figure
14-2 and across foreign countries in Figure 14-4 suggests that commensurate
rates of patent expiration would reveal a monotonically decreasing distribution
from left to right across the same states and countries. This, too, is not the case,
and a number of U.S. states accounted for patent expirations markedly higher
than their incidence of patent grants; these notably include Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio, as shown in Figure 14-2. Foreign countries with similar
trends include Taiwan, France, and the U.K., illustrated by Figure 14-4.
The economic significance of these grant-to-expiration comparisons resides
in the value of patent grants and expirations as indicators of economic growth
and decline, 90 though the reliability of these indicators remains the subject of
active debate. 9 1 Indeed, as analogous trends across technology categories reveal,
the relative scale of patent grants and expirations can be instructive as to the
economic forces at work.
As Figure 15 shows, patent expirations during 2008-2012 remained fairly
stable at around 1,000 per month, albeit with discernible differences among
categories, particularly "Drugs and Medical" as the lowest. By contrast, Figure
16 shows patent grants during the same period diverging sharply across
technology categories, particularly "Computers & Communications" patents,
which nearly doubled from over 4,000 per month in mid-2008 to approximately
8,000 per month by the end of 2012. Similarly, "Electrical & Electronic" patents
rose by half from nearly 3,000 per month in mid-2008 to approximately 4,500
by the end of 2012. Monthly patent grants in the other four categories,
meanwhile, started between 1,000 and 2,000 per month in mid-2008 and rose to
no more than approximately 2,500 per month by the end of 2012.
90. See JONATHAN ROTHWELL ET AL., PATENTING PROSPERITY: INVENTION AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS METROPOLITAN AREAS 14-15 (2013), available
at www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2013/02/patenting%20prosperity%20roth
well/patenting%20prosperity%20rothwell.pdf (providing a detailed, geographically segmented
analysis of invention and patenting as a driver of regional economic performance).
91. See Zvi GRLICHES, R&D AND PRODUCTIVITY: THE ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE 321
(1998), available at http://papers.nber.org/books/gril98-1.
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Thus, even in 2008, the magnitude of grants for "Computers
Communications" and "Electrical & Electronic" patents were already out of
reach of these technology categories' respective rates of expirations by three-tofourfold, and only rose further while expirations remained stable. Thus, as
Figure 17 confirms, the rate of patent expirations per month were a fraction of
patent grants during the same month, which showed only a modest overall
decline.
Nevertheless, the rates of grants for patents in the other four technology
categories started in 2008 at a scale much closer to that of these categories'
respective rates of expiration, approximately double at most and lower in some
cases. Thus, as Figure 17 further shows, the rate of patent expirations per month,
as a fraction of patent grants during the same month, was markedly more volatile
in its decline among these slower-granting technology categories.
Yet across technologies, the relative stability of expirations per month
suggests that the changing throughput of old inventions lapsing into the public
domain as new inventions enter into patent protection may not necessarily be the
result of patent owners more keenly maintaining their existing rights. Rather, it
may result from a large influx of new rights with recent vintage that have largely
not yet reached a potential expiration event. In Figure 16, the structural break
toward rising patent grants appears to have begun in January 2010, meaning that
the first opportunities for these patents to expire arrived in 2014, or will arrive
later.
Whether they do expire, or instead prove valuable enough to maintain,
transact, or litigate, will implicate persistent and important systemic questions
regarding patent examination quality and the economic efficiency of the patent
system.
C. FurtherResearch

To answer these questions in an informed and defensible way, further detailed
empirical research is required. Accordingly, the data presented here is
particularly amenable to matching with related patent data forthcoming from the
USPTO and other sources.
Among these is the examination history of applications that have led to issued
patents, currently available on an individual basis from the USPTO's Patent
Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. 92 Thus, matching in bulk the
expiration data of patents with earlier prosecution events of particular interest,
may, on one hand, reveal significant or predictive relationships between
92. Patent Application Information Retrieval, USPTO.GOV, portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair
(last visited Jan. 7, 2014). In addition to the Public PAIR system, which provides prosecution
history information on pending applications and issued patents, the USPTO also provides the
Private PAIR system by which registered filers may access Public PAIR information as well as
real-time status information, application documents, and transaction history for their own pending

patent

applications.

Private PAIR:

Quick Start

www.uspto.gov/patents/process/status/private

Guide,

USPTO

1-2

pair/PrivPaiOverviewOct09.pdf.

(Oct.

2009),
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examination events and applicant behavior, and the likelihood of expiration on
the other. Examination events of interest may include use by examiners of
restriction 93 and use by applicants of continuation practice 94 or administrative
appeal following a final rejection. 95 Relatedly, applicant behavior of interest
may include the amendment or cancellation of claims or legal counterargument
in response to non-final rejections based on various insufficiencies in
patentability, such as anticipation, obviousness, indefiniteness, and nonenablement. 96

Conversely, the assertion of patents in litigation is also likely correlated with
incidences of the expiration and maintenance of patents. As recent empirical
research shows, whether litigation arises around particular patents is often a
complex product of the intrinsic and after-acquired qualities of the patents at
issue, 97 notwithstanding market actors' subjective appetite for risk in the
outcomes of patent litigation.98 Notably, Professor Colleen Chien has found that
93. Multiple independent and distinct inventions claimed in a single application may be
required to be restricted to one of the inventions, with any remaining inventions becoming the
subject of divisional applications. See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012) (authorizing restriction and division);
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.141, 1.142 (2012) (regulating the treatment of different inventions in a single
national application); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 800 (9th ed. 2014)
(describing USPTO restriction practice).
94. Applications subject to final rejection by the USPTO may receive continued examination
with or without amendment, though no new matter may be introduced into the disclosure of the
invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (authorizing continued examination following a final rejection);
37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (regulating conditions and limitations on requests for continued examination);
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 706.07(h) (9th ed. 2014) (describing USPTO
continued examination practice).
95. Rather than seeking continued examination after final rejection by the USPTO, an
applicant may appeal the examiner's decision to the USPTO Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(formerly the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences). See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (authorizing appeal

within the USPTO following a final rejection); 37 C.F.R. § 41.64 (regulating ex parte
administrative appeals of final rejections); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 1200

(9th ed. 2014) (describing USPTO appeals practice).
96. The decision to amend or cancel claims, make legal or factual counter-arguments, or
employ a mixed approach in response to an examiner rejection is a question of considerable
strategic importance because amendments and arguments employed to reach a finding of
patentability create estoppel against construing claims too broadly after issuance. See Festo Corp.

v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734-35 (2002).
97. See Alan C. Marco & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH.
103, 107-12 (2013) (discussing litigation as a decision point in the innovation cycle and sampling
the empirical legal literature regarding the qualities of patents that render them more likely to
emerge in litigation).
98. See Damon C. Andrews, Why Patentees Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 219,
248-51 (2011) (proposing that litigation costs and risk diminish the value of patent remedies, such
as damages and injunctions, so patentees often plan for settlement before investing too heavily in
litigation). See also Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market
and How Should We Change? The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 6869 (2006) (quantitatively comparing the costs and risk of litigation between plaintiffs and
defendants and concluding that risk aversion can allow even demonstrably invalid patents to persist
in the market).
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post-issuance investment in patents-including, in her model, the payment of
maintenance fees-is correlated with a higher incidence of litigation,99 though
the robustness of these findings has invited divergent discussion regarding
source data and methodology.100 Moreover, literature suggests that intrinsic
patent qualities generated during examination and characteristic of the patent
from issuance, such as the number of claims, the number of backward citations
to prior art, and the number of jurisdictions in which patent protection is
concurrently sought, tends to correlate with patent value, 01 which can also drive
litigation. 102 It remains a relatively open proposition, however, that the afteracquired qualities of a patent, such as the number of forward citations to that
patent in subsequent patents, the post-issuance investment in the patent, and any
securitization of the patent, tend to correlate with value. If these qualities
correlate with a patent's value, then the relationship among the after-acquired
traits of patents, the determinacy of patent value, and the incidence of patent
litigation may be endogenous; this may require further disentanglement of cause
from effect. For that analysis, matching patent expiration data with litigation
data from sources such as the Lex Machina1 03 or Thomson Derwent LitAlert1 04
databases may contribute meaningfully.
Addressing the question of patent ownership may be helpful for a range of
research questions pertaining to the uses, potential abuses, and lapses of patents
into the public domain. By granting access to existing data, the USPTO provides
a searchable online query system through its Assignments on the Web
interface.105 The quality of the underlying assignment and ownership
information, however, requires improvement, 106 particularly with respect to
patents that may be held by so-called patent-assertion entities. 107

99. Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 304-06, 316-17,
320-21 (2011).
100. Jay P. Kesan et al., Paving The Path to Accurately Predicting Legal Outcomes: A
Comment on Professor Chien 's Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 97, 99102 (2012).
101. See Dietmar Harhoff, Frederic M. Scherer & Katrin Vopel, Citations, Family Size,
Opposition and the Value of PatentRights, 32 RES. POL'Y 1343, 1350-52 (2003).
102. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 439-443 (2004) (arguing
that the probability of litigation over a patent is a legitimate proxy for the value of the patent).
103. LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
104. Database: LITALERT, STNEASY, https://stneasy.cas.org/dbss/help.LITALERT.html
(last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
105. Assignment Search, USPTO.GOV, assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (last
visited Jan. 7, 2014).
106. See, e.g., 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 31, 129-31 (discussing the importance of
ascertaining clear patent ownership to the economically efficient clearance of freedom to operate).
107. Id. at 74-81, 90-92. The 2011 FTC Report identifies search costs and clarity in the
ownership record apart from claim boundaries and claim construction issues-as distinct
inefficiencies in adequately fulfilling the notice function of the patent system, and finds that the
resulting market opacity can aggravate the effects of patent assertion entity activity. Id.
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To this end, the USPTO has been gathering public commentary on potential
mechanisms for improving the recordation of patent assignments since
November 2011.108 In June 2013, the USPTO was tasked with developing a
notice of proposed rulemaking to require patent applicants and owners to
regularly update ownership information at specified times. 109 As these official
efforts create greater transparency and more detailed information regarding
patent ownership, matching such information to comprehensive data on patent
usage outcomes will be a valuable step for scholarly legal analysis of the patent
system.
III. CONCLUSION

The central contribution of this paper, and the anticipated value of this new
dataset of expired patents and its preliminary descriptive analysis, is to invite
and enable more detailed research into the balance of innovation in the United
States. Demands on Congress, the federal courts, and the USPTO to strike
increasingly nuanced policy balances and ensure that the patent system does not
hamper innovation or create economic inefficiency continue to grow.110 The
public commons to which all innovative activity must ultimately flow is an
important reference point by which to gauge the successes and failures of policyrelevant research, yet the nature of that commons remains to be better
characterized.

108. See Notice of Roundtable on Proposed Requirements for Recordation of Real-Party-inInterest Information Throughout Application Pendency and Patent Term, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,385,
70,385-89 (Nov. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 3); Request for Comments on Eliciting
More Complete Patent Assignment Information, 76 Fed. Reg. 72,372, 72,372-74 (Nov. 23, 2011).
See also Roundtable on Proposed Requirements for Recordation of Real-Party-in-Interest
Information, USPTO.GOV, www.uspto.gov/ip/officechiefecon/roundtable_01-11-2013.jsp
(last
updated June 10, 2013) (listing the full text of public comments and testimony received through
these information collections).
109. This USPTO rulemaking is in accordance with the widely publicized White House Task
Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, which issued seven legislative priorities and five executive
actions for improving innovation incentives in the U.S. economy. See Press Release, The White
House, FACT SHEET: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues (June 4, 2013),
available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-forcehigh-tech-patent-issues.
110. See id. (exemplifying the desire to encourage innovation, and thus, to stimulate the U.S.
economy).
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Table 1. Manual Concordance of Unassigned U.S. Patent Classes
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Figure 1. Mean Age of Expiring Patents by Technology Category (20082012) (six-month moving average)
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Figure 2. Average Age of Expiring Patents During 2009-2010
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Table 2. Mean Issue Month of Expiring Patents During 2009-2010
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Figure 3. Average Age of Expiring Patents During 2011-2012
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Tahle 3

Mean Issue Month of Exniring Patents During 2011-2012
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Figure 4. Mean Issue Month of Expiring Patents by Technology Category
(2008-2012) (six-month moving average)
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Figure 5. Monthly Issuances of Patents That Eventually Expired During

2008-2012
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Figure 6. Mean Age of Expiring Patents by U.S. State (2008-2012) (sixmonth moving average)
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Figure 7. Mean Issue Month of Expiring Patents by U.S. State (20082012) (six-month moving average)

%

L t

IL '4A

I
3MRn3d SUpiOR jOlpli1

neaOSI

.IAafy

2015]

Expired Patents

449

Figure 8. Variation from Mean Patent Age at Expiration for States with the
Highest 5-Year Total Patent Expirations
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Figure 9. Mean Age of Expiring Patents by Foreign Country (2008-2012)
(six-month moving average)
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Fig-ure 10. Mean Issue Month of Expiring Patents by Foreign Country
(2008-2012) (six-month moving average)
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Figure 11. Variation from Mean Patent Age at Expiration for Foreign
Countries with the Highest 5-Year Total Patent Expirations
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Figure 12-1. Patent Expirations by U.S. State Across Technologies (20082012) (six-month moving average)
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Figure 12-2. Patent Expirations by U.S. State Across Technologies (20082012), Percentage per HJT Category
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Figure 13. Patent Expirations by Foreign Country Across Technology
Categories (2008-2012) (six-month moving average)
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Figure 14-1. Patent Grants and Expirations Across U.S. States (20082012): Decreasing by Expirations (six-month moving average)
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Figure 14-2. Patent Grants and Expirations Across U.S. States (20082012): Decreasing by Grants (six-month moving average)
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Figure 14-3. Patent Grants and Expirations Across Foreign Countries
(2008-2012)
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Fig-ure 14-4. Patent Grants and Expirations Across Foreign Countries
(2008-2012) (six-month moving average)
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Figure 15. Patent Expirations by Technology Category (2008-2012) (sixmonth moving average)
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Figure 16. Patent Grants by Technology Category (2008-2012) (six-month
moving average)
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Fig-ure 17. Patent Expirations as a Proportion of Grants by Technology
(2008-2012) (six-mont moving average)
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